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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL BRAMEL and 
WILLIAM B. BROOKS, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
11479 
BRIEF OF RESP01NDENTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
Tlii:s is an action to recover damages for personal 
injnry sustaint>d by plaintiff, vVillam B. Brooks, and prop-
erty damage sustained by plaintiff, Paul Bramel, result-
ing from a one vehicle tractor-trailer accident that occur-
red on the off ramp at tlw temporary end of Interstate 
Highway 15 north of what is known as 31st Street Exit at 
or near Ogden, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER ,COURT 
The lower court found that the signs vlaced by the 
State of Utah failed to give notice of the dangerous condi-
tion that existed at the temporary end of the freeway and 
1 
found plaintiff 'Villiam B. Brooks free from any negli-
gence and awarded plaintiffs judgment in their favor and 
against the State of Utah for personal injury and pro1Jer-
ty damage in the sum of $27,878.25. 
RELIEF t;OUGHT ON APPEAL 
RPspondents seek to have the action of the lo-wer 
court affirmed in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff 8 
and against defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State of Utah constructed a portion of a freeway 
in 'VPber County, Utah identified as Interstate Highway' 
15, hereinafter ref erred to as I-15. This freeway is being 
constructed and completed in sections, and at the time 
in question the completed section of the freeway com-
menced near Kaysville, Davis County, and extended to the 
temporary ending thereof at or near Ogden, \Veber 
County. 
On the completed section of I-15 referred to, the free-
way is a divided north-south highway with thrPe traffic 
lanes on the northbound portion separated by intermittent 
white lines. The 31st street Exit is a one lane exit off tlw 
freeway which goes in a northeasterly direction from the 
highway at approximately 20 degrees. The off ramp at thP 
temporary end of the free·way north of the 31st Street 
Pxit is a one lane ramp which describes a tight arc of 270 
degrees, and which funnels traffic from three traffic lanes 
and a speed of 70 miles per hour (T13, R59) to one lane 
and a reduction of speed to 25 miles per hour (T20, R66) 
and forces it to change from a northerly direction through 
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three-quarters of a turn to a westerly direction. (See 
Exhibit D-15) 
On the day of the accident, November 29, 19G6, \:Vil-
limn Brooks was employed by Paul Bramel, and at that 
time, he was driving a 1966 Kenworth Diesel Tractor 
"with a 19G3 '11railer loaded with a cargo of cucmnbers 
"Which weighed approximately 40,000 pounds (TS-9, R54-
55). The onrall length of the rig was about 55 feet (T9, 
R55) "With the trailer being 38 feet long and 13% feet 
high (TlO, R5G). l\Ir. Brooks, who lives in Houston, 
Texas, was taking the cargo from Houston (Tll, R57) to 
Seattle, "Washington ('119, R55), and while driving had 
made it a }>ractice to drive for 10 hours and rest for 8 
homs. He left Houston Saturday morning and the acci-
dent occnrred at approximately 8 :00 o'clock P.M. Tuesday 
evening ('J111-12, R. 57-58). At the time of the accident it 
was dark, with patches of fog along the highway (T12, 
TI58) and tlw roadway 1rns slightl~' wet (TG7, R113). As 
i1ir. Brooks neared where the accident occurred, "it wasn't 
real foggy, hut it 1rns hazy," and he was traveling between 
30 miles per hom and 35 miles per hour with his head-
lights on ( Tl3, R59). HP 1rns not tired or drowsy at the 
time. ~lr. Brooks was llOt acquainted with the roadway 
or the natnre of the off ramp at the temporar~, end of the 
freP1rny. He saw Chenon signs somP distance from the 
temporary end of the freeway which indicated the ending 
of a lane or lanes (T19-20, (R65-66). Although l\Ir. 
Brooks reduced his s1wed, he 1rns unable to negotiate the 
tiglit clll"VP at the fn'P\\'a~, en<l off ramp and tllt' rig he 
1vas driving tipped over doing extensi1'e damage to it and 
n·:;~1lting in personal injury to him. 
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Mr. Brooks has been a driver of large tractor-trailer 
rigs involved in interstate traveling for about 25 years. 
He drives approximately 50,000 miles per year and has 
never had an accident before (TS, R54). 
The accident was invesigated by Utah High\Hl)' 
Patrolman Jack Graviet who stated that he had been dis-
patched to this same location to inn~stigate accidents on 
prior occasions (T87, R133). In making his investigation 
of the accident, the officer traversed the scene and a 
portion of the highway and stated that to the best of his 
recollection the following signs were in place: 
All Traffic Must Exit sign-one mile from scene 
Two 25 Mile Speed Limit signs-% mile from 
scene 
Barricades with arrows and 25 miles per hour sign 
-near end of freeway 
Red and white Chevron signs--at end of freeway 
(T72, Rll8, Tl92-193, R238-239) but there were no flash-
ing light at the end of the freeway ( Tl95, R241). 
John Lynn Owens, sign foreman for the State High-
way Department, testified that the following signs were 
in place at the time of the accident (TlOO, R14G): 
End Interstate One Mile-One mile from scene 
All Traffic Must Exit-By railroad crossing 
Single Lane Ahead 
Two 25 mph Exit signs-700 feet from ramp 
Exit 25 miles per hour-50 feet from ramp 
Chevron signs-Before ramp 
Arrows-At exit 
Barricades-At end of freeway 
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He stated that the State Engineer had furnished him with 
a diagram from which to install the signs (T121, R167), 
the installation of the signs began on N overnber 14, 1968, 
and \Vas completed November 21, 1968 (TlOO, R146), that 
tlw installation of the signs was a rush job for the dedica-
tion and opening of the roadway (T113, R159). 
Dean Prisbre>y, a traffic engineer for the Utah De-
partment of Highways stated in his testimony that the 
placing of the signs along the freeway warning of the 
condition that existed "·as a crash program in order to 
gt•t the fret>way open (Tl 77, R223). Exhibit P-8 is the 
Ptah Dt>partment of Highway Construction Signing plan 
showing the types, number, kinds and locations of signs 
that should be in place nnder the circumstances of this 
case, and t>\·en though the State has adopted this plan, 
all of the signs required thereby were not in place. The 
94 foot detour barricade sign with flashing amber lights 
showing that tlw road is closed and that a detour is 
necessary (Exhibit P-8) was not in place (T159, R205) 
and the Exit sign with an arrow shown on Exhibit D-7 
was not in place but was substituted by a black and yel-
lo\\' sign sho"·ing on!~· an arrow ('rl77-l78, R223-224). 
Although Exhibit P-8 requires that: 
"Construction approach warning signs, three 
48" x 48" warning signs, shall be located 500, 
1,000, 1,500 feet, respectively, in advance of the 
iwint of any flagnmn, construction activity, de-
tour barricade or other major traffic restriction." 
X o snch warning signs were in place when the accident 
occurred (T178, R224). 
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Kenneth W. Anderson, Deputy State Traffic En-
gineer, admitted that the design given to John Lynn 
Owens, the State's sign forman, was "really quite crude,: 
and that the original design for the installation of the 
signs is not available (T141-143, Rl87-189). 
Clyde Beutler was travelling approximately onP-
quarter of a mile behind Mr. Brooks when the accident 
occurred and witnessed it. (Deposition Beutler, Page 4-) 
He saw the erratic movements of the lights on the truck 
and slowed down (Pages 6-7). Mr. Beutler stated that 
he came to the curve at the off ramp, he saw one small 
sign which said ''Exit Speed 25'' but saw no other in-
dication that the freeway ended (Page 7). He stated 
that the curve to the off ramp was abrupt, that he had 
difficulty negotiating it (Page 12) and while he was at 
the scene of the accident, several cars that came along 
the freeway had difficulty negotiating the sharp curve 
that forms the off ramp at the end of the freeway (Pages 
17-18). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER 
COURT ARE PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT BY THE RE-
VIEWING COURT ON APPEAL. 
There are many cases supporting the general prop-
osition of law stated in Point I, and especially as it ap-
plies to the instant case. No cases have been found by re-
spondents stating a contrary position. 
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Not only is there a presumption of validity on appeal 
of the judgment and proceeding in the lower court, but 
the bnrden is on the appellant affirmatively to demon-
strate error and in the absence of such the judgment 
must be affirmed by the revie\ving court. Leithead vs. 
Adair, 10 U. 2d 282, 351 P. 2d 956; Coombs vs. Perry, 
2 U. 2d 381, 275 P. 2d. Again, on appeal the judgment 
o the trial court is presumptively correct and every 
reasonable intendment must be indulged in by the ap-
pellate court in favor of it. Burton vs. Zions Co-operative 
lliercuntilc Institidiou, 122 U. 360, 249 P. 2d 514; Nagle 
vs. ClulJ Fo11tainlJlue, 17 U. 2d 125, 405 P. 2d 346; Petty 
vs. Gindy Jliam1facturing Corporation, 17 U. 2d 32, 404 
P. 2d 30. 
This proposition of law is correct and is binding 
u1)0n the appellate court whether the proceedings in the 
lower conrt are before a judge only or a judge and jury. 
Otht>r cases supporting this proposition are Charlton 
'VS. Hackett, 11 U. 2d 389, 860 P. 2d 176; Universal ln-
t'cstme11t Company 'CS. Carpets, Inc. 16 U. 2d 336, JOO P. 
2d 564; Taylor vs. Johnson 15 U. 2d 342, 398 P. 2d 382; 
vV ClldellJOC vs. Jacouso11, 10 u. 2d 344, 353 P. 2d 178; 
Hadley vs. Wood, 9 U. 2d 366, 345 P. 2d 197; Daisy 
Distrilmtors, Inc., 1jS. Local Union 876, Joint Council 67, 
Western Confercnc<' of Teamsters, 8 U. 2d 124, 329 P. 
2d 414. 
Unquestionably an appellate court has the power to 
Pxamine the findings of fact of the court below to de-
termine whether they are supported by competent evi-
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dence, but a finding of fact made by a court acting with-
out a jury will be sustained on appeal unless it is shown 
by the appellant that such finding is clearly against the 
weight or preponderance of the evidence, Jackson vs. 
Jackson, 201 Okla. 292, 205 P 2d 297, 7 ALR 2d 1410; 
Edmundson's Estate, 295 Pa. 429, 103 A. 277, 2 ALR 
1150; Jhiggah vs. Smith, 33 ·wash. 2d 429, 206 P 2d 332, 
9 ALR 2d 846; Higbee vs. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 235 
Wis. 91, 292 NW 320 128 ALR 734, or is not supported 
by any substantial evidence, Van Voast vs. Blaine 
County, 118 Mont. 395, 167 P2d 572, 169 ALR 681; Wil-
son Oil Company vs. Hardy, 49 N.M. 337, 164 P 2d 209, 
1G2 ALR 292; or is clearly erroneous, Lassit!'r vs. Guy 
F. Atkinson Co. (CA9 Wash.) 176 F. 2d 984, 21 ALR 2d 
1313 (referring to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 52(a)); Pat.sy & Fiehrman, Inc. vs. Housing Author-
ity, 76 R.I. 86, 68 A 2d 126, 44 ALR 2d 1106. Where the 
evidence is evenly balanced, a finding of the trial court 
either way must be sustained as not against the great 
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence, K al.sop's 
Will, 229 Wis. 356, 281 NW 646, 282 NW 587, 119 ALR 
1094. 
It is a general rule of law that the appellate court 
does not ordinarily review the trial court's findings of 
fact whether the findings of fact are based on direct 
proof or upon inferences drawn from the evidence, Idaho 
State Bank vs. Hooper Sugar Co., 74 Utah 24, 276 P. 659, 
68 ALR 969. 
Therefore, if appellant, the State of Utah, can pre-
vail on the instant appeal it must be basPd upon the 
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ground that the findings of fact complained of by ap-
pellant are clearly against the weight and preponderance 
of tlw evidence, or that they are not supported by any 
snbstantial evidence, or that the findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous. Respondents submit that appellant is 
unable to do this and that the Findings of Fact, Con-
clnsions of Law and the Judgment of the lower court 
must stand undisturbed. 
POINT II 
THE FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT "AT 
MOST" ONLY CERTAIN LISTED SIGNS HAD BEEN IN 
PLACE AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT IS NOT ER-
RONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
Point II of Respondents' Brief will deal with the 
same subject matter and will be written in answer to 
Point I of Appellant's Brief. 
In relation to the signs and markers at and near the 
temporar~- end of the freeway ':vhere this accident oc-
curred, the Court made, inter alia the following Findings 
of Fact (R 31): 
5. That reflectors, markers and signs had 
been placed in various locations on the said free-
way for the purpose of notifying and advising 
motorists of e·xisting roadway and conditions, that 
at most the signs included "Freeway Ends One 
Mile," at a point about one mile south of the off 
racp, "All Traffic Must Exit" about one-half mile 
south of the off ramp, two black on yellow 25 
miles per hour speed signs about one-fourth mile 
from the e·xit, several red and white chevron 
channelizing signs, a horizontal black on white 
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unlighted barricade at or immediately north of 
the exit, a 25 miles per hour black on yellow exit 
sign at or immediately south of the exit and a 
black on yellow arrow at the north edge of the 
exit. 
rrhe witnesses at the trial who testified about the 
number and kinds of signs that were in place along tlw 
freeway when the accident occurred ·were William Brooks, 
plaintiff; Dean Prisbrey, Traffic Engineer, District I, 
Utah State Department of Highways; John Lynn 0-wens, 
Sign Foreman, District I, Utah State Department of 
Highways; Kenneth W. Anderson, Deputy State Traffic 
Engineer, State of Utah; Jack Graviet, Utah Highway 
atrolman; and Clyde Beutler, a motorist and witness to 
the accident who was approximately one-quarter of a 
mile behind Mr. Brooks when the accident occurred. 
John Lynn Owens testified that certain signs were 
placed along the freevrny by him between November 14, 
1966, and November 21, 1966 (TlOO, R146). However, 
he did not know what signs were in place when the ac-
cident occurred and he had no accurate memory of what 
signs he originally put up (T113, R159) and that there 
were some signs put up and existing signs changed after 
the accident (Tl07, R153). 
Dean Prisbrey testified that he had seen the signs 
along the freeway on November 23, 1966, and the signs 
he recalls being there were the following: ( 1) Ogden 31st 
Street Exit, (2) Route Marker (3) All Traffic Must Exit, 
(4) Advisory Speed Sign, (5) Arrow sign, and (6) 25 
miles per hour sign (Tl56, R202). The 94 foot detour 
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harricade with amber flashing lights as called for by the 
Department of Highways' plans was not in place (T159, 
R205). 
Kenneth Anderson stated that he drove over the 
section of the highway in question but did not make a 
record of the signs in place and hence did not know what 
signs had been installed (Tl34, R180). He did, however, 
know that the design for the installation of the signs 
"'vas really quite crude." (Tl41-143, Rl87-189) 
Utah State Highway Patrolman Jack Graviet who 
investigated the accident and traversed the portion of 
the freeway in question said that the following signs 
were in place at the time of the accident: (1) All Traffic 
.Must Exit sign about one mile from scene of accident, 
(2) Two 25 miles per hour speed limit signs about one-
quarter of a mile from scene of accident, (3) Barricades 
with arrows near the end of the freeway with 25 miles 
per hour sign, and, ( 4) Red and white Chevron signs at 
the end of the freeway. He further stated that there were 
no flashing lights at the end of the freeway ( Tl95, R241). 
Clyde Beutler testified that he did not see any Chev-
ron barricades (Deposition of Clyde Beutler, Page 24) 
or anv Chevron signs prior to the exit (page 34) nor 
did he recall any signs at the exit other than a speed 
sign and a barricade and arrow sign (page 11) and an 
exit speed 25 sign at the curve of the off ramp (page 7). 
It is obvious from the preceeding cursory review of 
the testimony of those who had any knowledge or who 
were supposed to have some knowledge of what signs 
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were in place when the accident occurred that it is very 
difficult to say exactly what signs 'vere up. The testi-
mony is in conflict, and none of appellant's witnesses 
had any knowledge of what signs \Vere in place at the 
time of the accident. 
Clyde Beutler's testimony of the in place signs was 
different from that of Jack Graviet, the investigating 
officer. Appellant complains in Point I of its brief that 
the lower court did not accept in total the testimony of its 
witnesses. 
In a non-jury trial, the trial judge is empowered to 
reconcile conflicts and discrepancies in the proof offered, 
Armstrong vs. Grant (Tex. Civ. App.) 356 SW 2d 398. 
\Vhere the evidence is in conflict, the trier of fact, 
whether that be a judge or a jury, determines what should 
be accE~pted as the truth and what should be rejected 
as untrue or false, Cross vs. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 
53 Ohio Ops. 361, 120 NE 2d 118; Rice vs. Cleveland, H4 
Ohio St. 299, 29 Ohio Ops. 447, 58 NE 2d 768. It is a 
general rule of law supported by the overwhelming 
weight of authority that the trier of fact may disbelieve 
all or any part of the testimony of a party or witness 
if it is tainted with evasiveness, uncertainty, or contra-
dictions, or that the finder of fact may believe only such 
portion of the evidence that st>ems credible in the light 
of other evidence, Bnrns vs. Radoicich, 77 Cal. App. 2d 
697, 176 P 2d 77; Berger vs. Steiner, 72 Cal. App. 2d 208, 
164 P. 2d 559. Utah cases supporting the propositions of 
law statt'd above are Schlatter 'CS. McCarthy, 113 Utah 
54:1, 196 P. 2d 968, reh den 113 Utah 560, 198 P. 2d 473, 
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where plaintiff's witnesses and defendant's witnesses 
gave conflicting testimony, the jury was entitled to be-
lieve the testimony of plaintiff's witness. Aagard vs. 
Dayton & illi.ller Red-E-lllix Concrete Co., 12 Utah 2d 34, 
361 P. 2d 522, which states that although the trier of 
fact cannot arbitrarily disregard competent, credible and 
uncontradicted testimony, it may determine the weight 
to be given testimony, and may refuse to find in accord-
ance with it where there is any circumstance which 
reasonable provides a basis for such refusal. 
As has been stated, the testimony of almost all wit-
nesses is conflicting as to exactly what road signs were 
in place at the time and place of the accident. None of 
the defendant's witnesses could say what signs were in 
place, however, all of the State's witnesses did say that all 
of the signs required by the State's own plan for signing 
were not in place·. As it was the trial Court conceded to 
the State of Utah most of the signs that it claims were 
there. 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, respondents 
respectfully assert that Point I of appellant's brief is 
without merit. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING ON THE EVI-
DENCE THAT THE SIGNS AS PLACED BY THE STATE 
FAILED TO GIVE ADEQUATE, REASONABLE OR SUF-
FICIENT NOTICE. 
In relation to the signs placed at or near the place 
where the accident occnred, the trial court made the fol-
lmving finding: 
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G. That at the said time and place the signs 
placed by the State failed to give adequate, reas-
onable or sufficient notice of a difficult and dan-
gerous condition which existed or of the fact that 
traffic would be required to turn onto a one lane 
sharply curving exit road and accomplish a 270° 
turn; 
From reading the findings of fact, it is obvious 
that the lmYer court did not find that the signs did not 
give any warning or notice, but that they failed to gi\'e 
adt>quatP warning of a dangerous condition which existed 
at the end of the freeway. 'J.'he dangerous condition that 
existed and for which the State did not give the motor-
ing public adequate warning ·was, (a) a 35 mph reduc-
tion in speed from 70 to 25 mph, ( b) the reduction of 
traffic lanes from three nvon "\Yhich a speed of 70 mph 
was permitted to one upon which a speed of only 25 mph 
was permitted, ( c) the one lane onto which the traffic 
from three lanes was channelled "\Yas a narrow sltarpl~­
curvi ng exit road, ( d) and that the sharply cuning one 
lam-' road accomplished a 270° turn. 
The lower court's finding that the State of Utah did 
not give the motoring lmblic reasonable notice of a dan-
g,'rnns condition that existt>d at thP t>nd of tht> freewa:· 
is amply dt>monstrated hy thv evidence. It should be 
nokll that the State did not erect all of the kinds or 
amounts of signs as srweified by the construction sign-
ing plan adopted by it. 'rhe signs that should have been 
in place according to the specifications of the State 
Highway Department are as follo\rn: (a) Construction 
approach warning :,;igns, three in number, (b) Exit sign 
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with arrow, and ( c) 94 foot detom banicade with amber 
flashing light. It appears from the evidence produced by 
thc~ State of Utah that it did not even meet its own mini-
1mm1 requirements for adequate signing on the freeway 
at the place of the accident. 
Title 41-6-48, Utah Code Annotated provides as fol-
lows: 
( e) The state road commission shall have ex-
clusive authority to determine and declare prima 
facie evidence of a lawful speed on state high 
ways whether such highways be within or without 
the corporate limits of any city. A state highway, 
to be appropriately posted, must be posted with 
reflector type signs whereon the prima facie law-
ful speed limit shall be designated. Wherever 
there is a drop of 10 MPH or more in the posted 
speed limit, it must be preceded by a sign giving 
advance notice of such a reduction. Signs shall 
be as specified in the current approved "Utah 
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices." 
There was a reduction of speed of 35 mph where 
the accident occmTt>d. As has bt>en said, the speed limit 
was reduced from 70 mph on three lanes of traffic to 
25 rnvlt for a sliarpl:· cnning narrmv one-lane exit road 
which descrilwd a 270° arc. Tlw State, therefore, failed 
to erect reduction in srwed signs as required by the 
Statutes of the State. The signs which the State of Utah 
erected certainl,\· gave notice but not of the dangerous 
condition that existed. An interesting analogy to the con-
dition that existed where the accident occurred is the 
temporary end of the freeway at Page's Lane at or near 
Centerville, Davis County. There the freeway comes to 
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an end and the road signs so indicate. However, the road 
into which the freeway leads continues on in a northerly 
direction, and the traffic on the freeway is channelled 
from 3 northbound lanes on the freeway to 2 northbound 
lanes on the old road. At that point there is at most a 
10 mph reduction in speed. A motorist who has recently 
traversed the freeway near Centerville as Mr. Brooks 
had would reasonably believe that the same conditiun 
existed at Ogden unless he was specifically warned. Of 
course, he was given no such notice or warning. 
There are many cases dealing with the liability of a 
State for the failure of its Highway Commission or De-
partment to erect or maintain proper traffic control 
signs or for the improper placing or maintenance of such. 
No case covers the precise question presented on appeal 
herein. 
Brown, et al. vs. Highu·ay Commission of Kansas, 
444 P. 2d 887 (Kan. 1968) was a case that involved an 
automobile accident which resulted in the death of a 
mother and her six year old son and brain damage to her 
eight year old daughter ·who were passengers in a vehicle 
traveling on a state highway at an intersection ·with a 
c-onntr>· road. Plaintiff's vehicle \ms struck by tort-
foasor motorist who failed to obsene and stop at a stop 
:-;ign on tlw subservient road which stop sign was ob-
scnrred from sight b>· bushes and trees. Plaintiffs claim-
ed that the fact that the stop sign was obscured was a 
defect in the highway and the Highway Commission 
denied on the ground that since the stop sign was not on 
the travelled portion of the roadway it was not such a 
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defect. The court stated that even though the stop sign 
was not on the travelled portion of the roadway that 
fact did not preclude it from being a defect in the high-
way. The court further went on to say that the adoption 
of a Uniform Traffic Control Manual by the State High-
way Commission imposes an absolute duty on the High-
way Commission to conform to the rules set out in the 
Manual, and hence an absolute duty to maintain traffic 
control devices at the intersection with a through high-
way. It is sufficient merely that the defective condition 
affect the safety of the highway. Although the State 
Highway Commission has discretion to designate a road 
as a State Highway, once it does so it has an absolute 
duty to comply with the requirements of the Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices and to install and main-
tain traffic control devices sufficient and efficient to 
control traffic entering thereon. 
In that case the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed a 
judgment of $102,029 for plaintiffs stating that a fivP 
foot high stop sign which was obstructed by bushes and 
shrnbs was not effectively warning motorists, that the 
sign should have been at least seven feet high and hence 
it was a defect in the highway. 
Other cases taking substantially this same view are 
Fanning vs. City of Larmnie, 402 P. 2d 460 (Wyo. 1965), 
improperly maintained stop sign; Luddy vs. State, .... 
N.Y.S. 2d .... (N.Y. Ct. Claims, No. 42938, 1968), failure 
to warn motorist of a deceptively re-routed highway; 
WelJer vs. State, (Cal. Trial Ct., Feb, 1968) 11 ATL New 
L. 156-157, failure to post sign warning of a treacherous 
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CHlT(' on a G5 mph road; State t·s. Watson, 436 P. 2d 175 
(Ariz. 19G7); State's liability for failure to warn motor-
ist of a narrow bridge; ran Airsdalt? vs. H oUingr:'r, GG 
Cal. Rptr. 20, 437 P. 2d 508 (Cal, 1968) City's liability 
for negligence of indepPndent contractor, under non-
delegable duty exception, for contractor's negligence in 
handling job of eradicating white line markings on a 
bnsy street while keeping one of three lanes of traffic 
opPn to traffic; Pfeifer vs. City of Jan Joaquin, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 103 (Cal. App. 19GG) County eliminated pedestrian 
crosswalk but failed to obliterate "Ped Xing" warning 
on highway. See also Stone vs. Arizona Highway Commis-
sion, 381 P. 2d 107 (Ariz. 1963), Jcmita Rice, Spec. Adm:r. 
1·s. Clark County r:'t al., 328 P. 2d 605 (Nev. 1963). 
It seems abundantly clear from the facts of the in-
stant casP that the State of Utah failed to give reason-
able and adequate notice or warning to motorists of tlw 
dang0rous condition of the highway at the temporary Pncl 
of the freeway. Not all of the necessary signs were in-
stalled and the signs that were in place were not cor-
relatPd as to the warning or notice that should have been 
gfren. In fact, the signs that were installed not only 
failed to give adequate warning of the dangerous con-
ditions, they were deceptive in what they stated. After 
haYing seen all of the signs, the State had installed or 
wanted to install, there was still not adequate notice, or 
an~· notice at all for that matter, of a greatly reduced 
s1wed limit, an extreme narrffwing of the roadway, a 
11arrow, sharp, hazardous, curving exit road, and a sud-
den change of direction on the narrow, sharp, dangerous 
and hazardous exit road of 270°. 
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Respondent contends that on the basis of the facts 
of this case and the law as st·t forth that the lower 
court's finding in this regard was reasonable and ac-
curate. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE 
DRIVER, BROOKS, OPERATED THE UNIT IN A REASON-
ABLE AND PRUDENT MANNER. 
Respondent incorporates into Point IV of this brief 
the facts, law and argument set forth under Point III. 
The lower court found ''that Brooks was driving 
the said unit in a reasonable and prudent manner, was 
unable to negotiate the exit from the freeway as a result 
of which the unit left the roadway and overturned" 
(R32, 33). 
In this regard it should be born in mind that it vms 
dark, the roadway was wet or moist, it was foggy in 
places along the roadway, the State of Utah had not 
erected all of the necessary signs under its own con-
struction signing plan, and the signs that were installed 
did not give warning of the dangerous condition that 
existed at the temporary end of the freeway. Couple 
this with the fact that Mr. Brooks has been an interstate 
trucker for about 25 years, drin's approximately 50,000 
miles per year and has never before had an accident, he 
was not tired having had a rest stop in Price, Utah, and 
the fact that he was driYing a large rig with a load of 
about 40,000 pmmds at a speed of approximately 30 to 
35 mph. It is obvious why the trial court found Mr. 
Brooks free from negligence. 
It is also of interest to note that the investigating 
police officer had been called to investigate other acci-
dent:;; at the place in question and it was his opinion that 
the accident was the result of inadequate markings and 
the sharp curve or inadequate engineering and markings 
and the sharp curve (T92, R138). Mr. Brooks also told 
the investigating officer that the highway was not prop-
erly marked ( T72, R118). ·when all of this is considered 
with the testimony of Clyde Beutler, that the traffic con-
trol signs were inadequate, he had difficulty negotiating 
tht• curve immediately after the accident, and while he 
was at the scene, several other vehicles had difficulty 
negotiating the cnrve of the exit road, thunders that thP 
cause of this accident was not caused by any negligence 
on the part of Mr. Brooks but because of the negligence 
of the State of Utah. 
Respondent frankly admits that the evidence re-
ceived immediately above is not conclusive but does 
suggest that it is extremely persuasive and is sufficient 
basis for the lower court's finding. 
The question of negligence is a matter for the de-
termination of the finder of fact, and unless reasonable 
mind:;; could not differ, the finding of the lower court 
must he sustained. Respondent respectfully submits that 
reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Brooks 
was negligent at the time and place of the accident. If 
this is trne, then the finding of the lower court must re-
main undisturbed on appeal. 
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The propositions of law stated herein are basic 
being what is commonly referred to as hornbrook law, 
therefore, respondent has not cited any authorities for 
the rules of law stated. 
POINT V 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DRIVER, BROOKS WOULD 
BAR ANY RECOVERY BY THE DRIVER OR HIS EM-
PLOYER, OWNER OF THE DAMAGED UNIT FROM THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
While agreeing with the general rule of law stated 
in Point IV of appellant's brief, respondent denies any 
negligence on the part of the driver, Brooks. 
There is no question that Paul Bramel owned the 
rig William Brooks was driving at the time and place of 
the accident. It is also a fact that Brooks was an employee 
of Bramel in the scope of his employment at the time. It 
is conceded that if Brooks was negligent at the time of 
and place of the accident his negligence would be a bar 
to any recovery by either himsrlf or Mr. Bramel against 
the State of Utah. The trial court, however, found Mr. 
Brooks free from negligence and respondents believe 
that to be a reasonable finding under all the facts and 
circumstances of this casf'. 
For the sake of brevity, respondent incorporates the 
contents of Point IV of this brief into Point V hereof. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs-Respondents respectfully assert that the 
position taken by Defendant-Appellant in this case and 
as presented in Points I-IV of its brief is not well taken. 
Considering the record on appeal, with the exhibits as 
part thereof, and the argument contained in its brief, 
appellant is not entitled to the relief it seeks in this mat-
ter since no error was committed by the trial court in 
its disposition of this case. 
Based on the foregoing facts, authorities, and argu-
ment, it appears clear that this court should affirm the 
jndt,:r:inent of the District Court wherein judgment was 
granted in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
Carman E. Kipp, and 
D. Gary Christian 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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